The Role of Sharing and Information Type in Children\u27s Categorization of Privileged and Conventional Information by Girgis, Helana
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
ScholarWorks@UARK
Theses and Dissertations
12-2015
The Role of Sharing and Information Type in
Children's Categorization of Privileged and
Conventional Information
Helana Girgis
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Child Psychology Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, and the
Developmental Psychology Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Girgis, Helana, "The Role of Sharing and Information Type in Children's Categorization of Privileged and Conventional Information"
(2015). Theses and Dissertations. 1324.
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1324
 
 
 
The Role of Sharing and Information Type in Children’s Categorization of Privileged and 
Conventional Information  
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
 
 
by  
 
 
Helana Girgis  
University of North Carolina Chapel Hill 
Bachelor of Arts of Psychology, 2008 
University of North Carolina Wilmington 
Master of Art of Psychology, 2011  
 
 
December 2015 
University of Arkansas  
 
This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council  
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Douglas Behrend  
Dissertation Director  
 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. Denise Beike 
Committee Member  
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Dr. Scott Eidelman  
Committee Member  
 
 
Abstract 
Categorization is an essential part of our daily lives and an integral part of humans’ 
ability to function and interact within society.  There are large bodies of research that document 
children’s categorization in domains such as natural kinds, artifacts and human kinds.  One 
domain that has not been investigated is children’s ability to categorize different types of 
information; specifically conventional information, shareable to others with no restrictions, and 
privileged information, shareable to only a few.  Study 1 investigated 4- and 5-year-olds and 
adults’ ability to categorize conventional and privileged information.  All participants correctly 
categorized both types of information equally well at above chance levels, though each older age 
group performed significantly better than the younger age group.  Study 2 investigated whether 
4- and 6-year-old and adults categorize information by its category membership or whether the 
information is shared or not shared.  Four-year-olds and adults categorized conventional 
information by its category membership and did so significantly more than 6-year-olds.  There 
was no pattern of responses to the categorization for privileged information by participants in 
any age group.  Though this ability develops with age, by the age of 4 children are able to 
distinguish between and identify conventional and privileged information.  There appears to be a 
U-shaped curve of development for categorizing conventional information by its category 
membership, which is not apparent in the categorization of privileged information.      
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The role of sharing and information type in children’s categorization of privileged and 
conventional information  
Categorization is a ubiquitous and essential part of our daily lives (Carey, 1985; 
Diesendruck, 2003; Gelman, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996; Murphy, 2002; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  
It is an integral part of a human’s ability to function and interact within society and the world at 
large.  Importantly, when categorizing any entity, people make inferences about its properties 
and based on these properties, know how to act around it and what to predict from it 
(Diesendruck & Weiss, 2014; Gelman, 2003; Murhpy, 2002; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  People 
also use their previous knowledge of categorized items to infer the label and properties of novel 
items, thereby reducing unpredictability.  People can efficiently maneuver throughout their 
world, applying past knowledge to categorize future people, objects, food; indeed almost 
anything that is liable to be encountered.  This is a necessary part of conceptual development in 
building cohesive, integrative and structured mental representations of the world (Murphy, 
2002).  It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that without the ability to categorize, the 
time and effort to identify one’s surroundings and to avoid danger would stop life as it is now 
(Murphy, 2002).  A key goal of research in cognitive development is to understand how children 
learn and integrate knowledge into categories and concepts.   
There are large bodies of research on children’s categorization in domains such as natural 
kinds, artifacts and human kinds, which have culminated in theoretical perspectives of 
conceptual development in these areas (for examples see Gelman, 2003; German & Johnson, 
2002; Hirschfeld, 1996).  One domain of which there is little knowledge is in children’s 
categorization of information.  This is a crucially important domain and one that our daily lives 
revolve around.  In today’s global society with its technological advances, there is constant 
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exposure to information.  People are being told information, overhearing it, observing it and 
actively researching it.  Much of our ability to successfully interact with our world is based on 
the acquisition and appropriate dissemination of information.  Not all such external information 
is the same nor is one always informed if it can be shared with others or not.  Some information 
is conventional in nature, which is available to everyone without any restrictions on its 
dissemination, and hence can be told to anyone; for example, general knowledge and game rules.  
Other types of information are privileged in nature, which is not available to everyone and is 
intentionally concealed and restricted in its dissemination, and hence are only shared with few, if 
any, people; for example, personal information and secrets.  To my knowledge, this dissertation 
will be the first to examine children’s categorization abilities for these types of information.   
This dissertation seeks to answer two questions:  1) can preschool children categorize 
information as privileged and conventional and 2) do children categorize privileged and 
conventional information by the type of information it is or by how it is used, specifically 
whether a person decides to share it or not.  For example, passwords are considered privileged 
information.  If a person decides to share his/her password with the general public, does this 
change the type of information or does it stay the same type regardless of whether the person 
shares it or not?  The second study, which will answer the second research question, will 
determine if children categorize information similarly to artifacts or to natural kinds.  Children 
utilize different criteria when categorizing members within each of these particular domains (i.e., 
natural kinds and artifacts), but for both domains I will examine this question within the 
essentialist perspective of categorization that will be described in a subsequent section.       
The first study is a standard object sorting task (for examples see, Goldberg, Perlmutter & 
Myers 1974; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1992; Markman, Cox, & Machida, 1981; Waxman & Gelman, 
3 
 
1986) in which pictures of the category labels depict conventional and privileged information, 
i.e., a face with a hand cupped to its mouth indicating talking and one with its finger to its lips 
indicating silence, respectively.  Test pictures conveying particular instances of conventional and 
privileged information are presented to the participants individually.  They will then be asked to 
place it in the box with the category label of the information type.   
 The second study examines if children categorize information based on its category 
membership (i.e., its label) or by its use (i.e., whether it is shared or not).  This study will use 
methods similar to those used to test whether natural kinds and artifacts are categorized by non-
obvious properties (e.g., internal characteristics or function) or their appearance.  Throughout 
this dissertation, I am considering the use of information (i.e., whether it is shared or not) to be 
analogous to artifacts’ function (e.g., how it is used).  While I realize that the term ‘use’ is more 
closely associated with whether information is disseminated to others or not, I have specifically 
used the term ‘function’ throughout the dissertation for ease of understanding whether the 
information is categorized similarly to natural kinds or artifacts.  For experimental trials, two 
target pictures will be presented and labeled by its type of information and function.  For 
example, participants will be shown a picture of privileged information and told it is private and 
not shared with other people.  Participants will then be shown a test picture, labeled with its 
correct information type but the incorrect function (e.g., this is private but it has been shared with 
other people).  Participants will then be asked which of the target pictures is most like the test 
picture; thereby determining if children use category membership (information type) or function 
(shared or not) when categorizing information.    
Since there is no research to date examining these specific research questions, my 
dissertation will focus solely on those types of information that are prototypically conventional 
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or privileged.  It is necessary to understand how children are categorizing the most typical 
examples of these information types before using more ambiguous examples.  While my 
dissertation will examine children’s categorization abilities within conventional and privileged 
information alone, a full discussion of information types would not be complete without 
reference to idiosyncratic information.  Doing so will also provide strong evidence regarding 
young children’s knowledge of different types of information.  Therefore, I will review the 
existing literature on children’s knowledge of conventional, privileged and idiosyncratic 
information.  I will then discuss the different criteria children use to categorize natural kinds and 
artifacts and whether either may be similar to how children categorize different types of 
information.   
Information Types  
 Most of the information children acquire at a young age is considered conventional 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  Conventional information encompasses a culture’s shared social 
norms, values, language, communication styles and general conceptual knowledge of the world 
(e.g., names of natural kinds and numbers, cultural artifacts, game rules, etc.; Csibra & Gergely, 
2009; Diesendruck, 2012).  This information is expected to be known by other members of the 
culture and is free to be shared under any circumstances and to the general public as a whole.  It 
would appear that a majority of our communications as adults is conventional.  This is certainly 
true when it comes to communication with young children (Csibra & Gergeley, 2009; 
Diesendruck, 2012; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Tomasello, 2008).  Properties that are common to 
all conventional information are that it is a) generic, or generalizable to other similar kinds; b) 
specific to one’s culture, e.g., the label of ‘cow’ to a domestic bovine animal is specific to 
English speakers; c) prescriptive, or normative in nature; d) expected to be understood by others 
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in one’s culture and e) can be shared with anyone under any circumstances (Diesendruck, 2012; 
Lewis, 1969).  While conventional information may seem arbitrary in its origin (e.g., the label 
‘cow’ for a domestic bovine animal instead of ‘woc’), it is the agreed standard within a culture 
and is culturally transmitted by each previous generation to the following generation (Kalish & 
Sabbagh, 2007; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006).   
Recent research supports the contention that young children attend to the use of ostensive 
cues in direct communication and treat the subsequently conveyed information as conventional 
in a process known as natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  Children do appear to be 
cognitively predisposed to interpret new information as generic, therefore shareable, and known 
by all others (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Diesendruck, 2012; Kalish & Sabbagh, 2007).  For 
example, children as young as 3-years-old will assume a stranger knows the name of novel 
objects even if the stranger was absent when the novel object was first labeled (Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001).  Diesendruck and Markson (2001) presented two novel objects to participants in 
this age group.  In one condition, a researcher labeled one of the novel objects with a novel name 
in front of a second researcher.  In the second condition, the second researcher was absent during 
the initial labeling of the novel object.  In both conditions, the second researcher asked for an 
object using a different novel name than given by the first researcher.  Both groups of 
participants gave the previously unnamed object to the researcher, demonstrating an expectation 
that the second researcher should know the name of the first labeled object even when not 
present at the initial labeling.  Young children also have an expectation that conventional 
information indicates normative communication or knowledge that represents accurate cultural 
information.  Children as young as 2-years-old will frequently correct those who label an object 
with an incorrect name (Kalish & Sabbagh, 2007) and will correct others who make a mistake 
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when playing a game (Rakoczy, Warneken & Tomasello, 2008).  Rakoczy et al. (2008) taught 2- 
and 3-years-olds the rules to a new game.  After some minutes of playtime, a puppet joined the 
game and performed an action that was either considered a mistake or not a mistake in the game.  
Participants verbally corrected the puppet more often when its actions were considered to break 
the game rules than when the action was not considered to break the game rules.  Therefore, even 
when someone was not privy to the demonstration of the rules of a new game, this information 
was expected to be known and was the basis for normative interaction.   
A second type of information I will discuss is idiosyncratic information (Diesendruck, 
2012).  Idiosyncratic information is particular to an individual, such as a proper name or personal 
preferences.  It is learned from the environment or originates from the person him/herself.  
Though it is often specific to one’s culture, it is not generic, e.g., your dog’s name is most likely 
not your neighbor’s dog’s name.  Examples of idiosyncratic information include one’s 
preference for a type of music, nicknames, and family or friendship traditions.  It is generally 
considered to be prescriptive for those who are privy to it.  For example, people should not be 
called by a name different from their own and family members may follow traditions for family 
vacations or birthday parties.  This is not information that is known or expected to be known by 
the general public, though it is intuitive that the information type is known by others.  People 
expect others to have a name, even though they may not know what it is.  While there are no real 
limitations on sharing this information with others, there are normative practices for when and 
what type of idiosyncratic information should be shared (Diesendruck, 2012).  A person would 
not share his/her name with random people at a grocery store, but would share the name when 
applying for a job.  Sharing family traditions or personal preferences may not be shared with 
bosses, strangers or casual acquaintances, but one may share the name of a pet with them. 
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The third type of information is privileged (Behrend & Girgis, under review).  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, the definition of privileged information adopts Watson and Valtin’s 
(1997) definition of a secret as “knowledge that is intentionally concealed but which may be 
shared with a restricted audience” (p. 432).  This definition thus encompasses taboos (e.g., 
sexual/physical abuse, substance abuse), rule violations (e.g., ‘partying’, cheating) and breaking 
social conventions or normative behavior (e.g., physical/mental health problems, poor academic 
achievement; Vangelisti, 1994; Vangelisti & Caughlin, 1997).  Privileged information is person-
specific and not considered generic.  This is not information that is known or expected to be 
known by the general public, though it is intuitive that the information type is known by others.  
While it pertains to an individual or to the individual with whom it is shared, the specific content 
of privileged information (specific examples of taboos, rule violations and social conventions) is 
based on cultural, societal and even community-based conventions and rules.  For example, the 
types of information considered to be privileged may differ in a rural, poor community as 
compared to a high SES urban or suburban area.  There are also social norms for when and with 
whom one shares privileged information.  Sharing privileged information under inappropriate 
circumstance or to inappropriate people (e.g., sharing personal information with a stranger in a 
grocery store line) is considered socially awkward, at the least, and can serve to decrease 
potential interpersonal interactions (Rubin, 1975).  Indeed, over-disclosure of personal 
information in inappropriate (i.e., non-normative) contexts is at times considered a symptom of a 
mental disorder (e.g., bipolar disorder, American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
The bulk of research on children’s knowledge of privileged information examines their 
secret sharing.  Examining 5-, 6-, 8-, 10- and 12-year-olds in Germany and Australia when 
sharing secrets with their mothers, Watson and Valtin (1997) found that 5- and 6-year-olds and 
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about half of the 8-year-olds consistently said they would reveal guilty (i.e., stealing money from 
mother’s purse) and dangerous secrets (i.e., setting a fire), while very few of the 10- and 12-year-
olds said they would reveal them.  Children in all age groups said they would not share the 
innocent secret (i.e., surprise present), but most said they would share an embarrassing secret 
(i.e., wetting pants at school).  The overall decline in sharing secrets with their mother for the 
older age groups came from an increased awareness of social consequences from peers, e.g., 
being ostracized by their social group.  This pattern of younger children being more likely to 
share secrets than older children has been replicated in other studies as well (Bottoms, Goodman, 
Shwartz-Kenney, & Thomas, 2002; Pipe & Wilson, 1994).  In a particularly clever study, Peskin 
and Ardino (2003) examined secret sharing in a context commonly encountered by young 
children: a hide and seek game.  In two experiments, 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds were asked to explain 
the game of hide and seek and then to actually play the game with a researcher, while a second 
researcher videotaped it.  Children in all three age groups were able to correctly describe how to 
play hide and seek, but only 4- (78%) and 5-year-olds (94%) could correctly play it (e.g., not 
peeking when counting or being visible when ‘hidden’) as compared to 3-year-olds (17%).  It 
appears from the literature on young children’s secret sharing that children younger than 5 or 6 
have limited abilities in being able to keep a secret.  Analogous to Peskin and Ardino’s (2003) 
findings, even though younger children do not have the mechanisms to inhibit the sharing of 
privileged information, this may not mean that younger children do not recognize or are not able 
to accurately identify types of privileged information.    
In summary, conventional information is known and expected to be known by all 
members of one’s culture and can be shared without restriction among the population.  While 
both idiosyncratic and privileged information are specific to an individual and not expected to be 
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known by members of one’s culture, these types of information differ in how they are shared 
with the larger public.  The former can be shared freely under the appropriate circumstances, 
while the latter is intentionally concealed from others while only being shared with a few people, 
if any.  Though it seems intuitive that every society has these three types of information, the 
specific information that will fit into each type may vary by culture.  Additionally, these types of 
information are prescriptive in nature.  There are normative rules in both knowledge of and 
dissemination of these different types of information.  The question now is to determine how and 
when children differentiate between these types of information.   
Children’s Differentiation of Information Types  
 Recall that the focus of this dissertation will be on children’s identification of privileged 
and conventional information and determining what criteria are used to categorize them.  While 
idiosyncratic information will not be included in the two experiments, it is a necessary 
component to understanding how and when young children are aware of different types of 
information and use this knowledge to modify their interactions with others.   
It seems young children do recognize and treat conventional and idiosyncratic 
information differently.  Diesendruck (2005) examined 3- and 4-year-olds’ understanding of 
others’ knowledge of referents of proper names (idiosyncratic) as opposed to common names 
(conventional).  Using the same methodology as Diesendruck and Markson (2001), 3- and 4-
year-olds were presented with two novel objects, one of which was labeled by a proper name.  A 
second researcher, who was either present or not present during the initial labeling, asked the 
participants for the object with the previously labeled proper name.  When the second researcher 
had been present, participants handed them the previously named object.  When the second 
researcher had not been present, participants randomly selected one of the two objects, indicating 
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they did not expect the second researcher to know the proper name of the object labeled by the 
first researcher.  These findings stand in contrast to Diesendruck and Markson (2001), in which 
preschoolers believed that even when absent, a person is familiar with the common (or 
conventional) names of objects.  This is true even when the label and objects are novel to the 
children.  In addition, young children treat personal preferences similarly to proper names.  
Graham, Stock, and Henderson (2006) examined whether 19-month-olds understood the referent 
of a speaker who asked for a common object versus a preferred object.  In this study, an 
experimenter looked in different boxes for a target toy, either one that was given a novel label 
(i.e., ‘where’s the mido?) or one that represented a desire (i.e., ‘where’s the one I want?’).  A 
second experimenter came in after the first left and asked the participant for either the ‘mido’ or 
the ‘one that I want’.  Overall, participants picked the target toy in the novel label condition, but 
not in the desire condition.  This expectation that others know conventional names, but not 
preferences (i.e., idiosyncratic information) has been extended to 9- and 12-month-olds 
(Henderson & Woodard, 2012; Novack, Henderson, & Woodard, 2014). 
The research examining children’s use and knowledge of conventional information and 
how it differs from idiosyncratic information has not been extended to privileged information.  
There is some recent research, though, that does indicate preschoolers have an emerging 
understanding about the differences between conventional and privileged information.  Behrend 
and Girgis (under review) examined whether 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds and adults shared 
conventional and privileged information differently.  Vignettes were presented to participants 
involving a character exposed to one of these types of information; then the experimenter asked 
the participant if this character should share it.  There were no differences in judgments of 
sharing conventional information among all age groups, but there were for privileged 
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information.  While only 5% of the adults judged that a character should share privileged 
information, at least 40% of the younger age groups judged that privileged information should be 
shared.  Though not similar to adult patterns, 5-year-olds did judge that privileged information 
should be shared significantly less frequently than conventional information, indicating they 
were making some distinction between the types of information.    
Anagnostaki, Wright and Bourchier-Sutton (2010) examined whether 4-, 5- and 6-year-
olds could identify secrets and non-secrets from a list of sentences that were previously 
determined to be secrets and non-secrets by adults.  Child participants were read aloud a short 
statement using a puppet as the protagonist and asked to determine if it was a secret (e.g., Zinc 
hit a child at school/nursery) or non-secret (e.g., Zinc’s home is close to the school).  The 
younger age groups did not differentiate between the secret and non-secrets, but the older age 
groups (ages 5.5 to 6.5) were similar to adults in their selection of secrets and non-secrets.  It 
appears from both the literature on secret sharing and on children’s distinction of conventional 
and privileged information that it is not until around the age of 6 that the ability to differentially 
identify and share this information emerges.   
In sum, preschoolers discriminate between conventional and idiosyncratic types of 
information and use this distinction to inform their actions around others (Birch & Bloom, 2002; 
Diesendruck, 2005; Graham et al., 2006).  Children’s recognition of the differences between 
conventional and privileged information, both in identification and appropriate sharing, appear to 
take longer to develop, emerging around the age of 6.         
As stated earlier, the goal of the first study is to examine if children can categorize 
information types as conventional and privileged.  The previous section defined these 
information types and presented evidence supporting that young children are aware of and treat 
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these types of information differently.  It has also shown a gap in the literature on children’s 
ability to differentiate between conventional and privileged information, which this study will 
help to fill.       
Categorization of Natural Kinds and Artifacts 
Recall that the second goal is to examine if children categorize privileged and 
conventional information using similar criteria to how natural kinds or artifacts are categorized.  
Natural kinds and artifacts represent two of the three domains which comprise most of the 
entities in our world.  The third is human kinds or social categories, e.g., race, gender, 
occupation.  These three, natural kinds, artifacts, and human kinds, have distinct sets of 
properties which we use to categorize its members, though the criteria used to categorize human 
kinds combines components of both natural kinds and artifacts.  It could be that information is 
categorized similarly to human kinds, but it must first be determined that it is not categorized 
similarly to natural kinds or artifacts.  Therefore, in this section, I will only review the criteria 
children use to categorize natural kinds and artifacts from the naïve theory and essentialist 
perspectives.   
A common approach to early conceptual development argues that children develop early 
competencies understanding the world around them by developing naïve theories of domains, 
such as physics and biology (Diesendruck, 2003; Noles & Gelman, 2012; Wellman, Hickling & 
Schult, 1997).  Other theories of children’s conceptual development have focused on the 
detection of similarities among category members, such as the attentional account which posits 
that children are using ‘dumb attentional mechanisms’ to make associations about the properties 
of category members and nonmembers (Smith, Jones, & Landau, 1996).  Yet the myriad of ways 
children could identify or select properties of category members or non-members by association 
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seems to be at odds with the young age and relative ease with which children are able to 
accurately categorize both known and novel entities.  Thus it seems likely that there are cognitive 
mechanisms which constrain children’s choices when categorizing or developing conceptual 
models (Murphy & Medin, 1985).  The naïve theory perspective posits that concepts are 
developed and constrained by naïve theories held concerning how the natural and social world 
operates (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Murphy, 2002).  Children are actively building naïve theories 
of natural kinds, human kinds and artifacts based on the evidence of how these entities interact 
with each other and their environment.  For example, water can change states (e.g., liquid to 
solid to gas), but it is not animate.  In order to produce a cohesive concept of water, we must 
integrate our theories (or knowledge) of chemistry and animate kinds (Murphy & Medin, 1985).  
Essentialism is considered to be a critical aspect of the naïve theory perspective specific 
to categorization.  In essentialist reasoning, the criterion used to categorize entities is based not 
on perceptual cues or similarities, but on the kind of entity it is (Gelman, 2003; Jaswal, 2004; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989; Noles & Gelman, 2012; Wellman et al., 1997).  Therefore, naming a 
novel object with the same name that was used for a previously known object (with a similar 
shape) is because the kind of object is similar, not because the shapes are similar (Markson, 
Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2008).  A typical example is even though a penguin is not perceptually 
similar to a typical bird (e.g., a robin), children understand that a penguin is a bird kind, which 
makes it a member of the category ‘bird.’  Gelman (2003) defines essentialism as “An 
underlying reality or true nature, shared by members of a category, that one cannot observe 
directly but that gives an object its identity and is responsible for other similarities that category 
members share” (p.6).  Rather than relying on statistical tracking of perceptual similarities 
among category members, the more reliable criterion is the entity’s category membership, 
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substance and function.  Please note while there are other conflicting perspectives of conceptual 
development, it is the beyond the scope of this dissertation to defend this theory of categorization 
over others (see Gelman, 2003 for full discussion).    
  Natural kinds.  Although there is an agreement that natural kinds and artifacts are to 
some degree essentialized by children, the most essentialized domain is natural kinds (Gelman, 
2003).  Natural kinds are considered natural, real, and objective categories.  These are entities 
that are discovered but not created and encompass domains such as biology, physiology and 
chemistry (e.g., animals, minerals, plants; Diesundruck, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986; 
Wellman, et al. 1997).  More importantly, natural kinds have clear, firm category boundaries that 
are not flexible (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1986).  The criteria used when 
categorizing natural kinds is not perceptual similarity, but category membership.  For example, a 
dog is a dog, regardless of the differences in outward appearances of subordinate categories (e.g., 
Great Dane or Pekinese), whether it barked or even had teeth.  To be a dog is more than the sum 
of its external features or behaviors.  A classic example of the properties of essentialism is if one 
changes the appearance of a gold bar, e.g., paints it black, and uses it as a doorstop, it does not 
change the gold bar into a black door stop (Gelman, 2003).   
In a landmark study, Gelman and Markman (1986) examined whether children would 
base their categorization of natural kinds on category membership or perceptual similarities.  
Four-year-olds were presented with triads of pictures.  For example, they were shown a picture 
of a dolphin and told “The dolphin pops above the water to breathe.”  The next picture was of a 
tropical fish, perceptually dissimilar to the dolphin, and the children were told “This fish stays 
underwater to breathe.”  Lastly, the researcher pointed to a picture of a shark, similar in 
appearance to the dolphin but labeled as a fish, and said, “See this fish? Does it breathe 
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underwater, like this fish, or does it pop above the water to breathe, like this dolphin?”  The 
results found that children adhered to category labels when inferring the animal’s category 
membership, disregarding how similar it looked to the animal in the different category.    
Gelman and Wellman (1991) further examined children’s use of an entity’s ‘insides’, or 
its nonobvious characteristics, as opposed to its appearance in a series of categorization tasks 
across five studies.  These studies provide strong evidence that children are indeed using internal 
properties rather than external properties to categorize items.  The authors found 3- and 4-year-
olds were able to identify novel category members based on their similarity to the target’s 
internal properties rather than on their perceptual similarity to a non-category member.  
Therefore, children could distinguish between the insides and outsides, even in the presence of 
conflicting information, and were able to successfully verbalize how the stimuli’s insides and 
outsides differed.  Four-and 5-year-olds believed that an animal’s internal properties, as opposed 
to its external ones, were necessary to an animal’s survival, its physical actions and behaviors.  
The last studies used an adoption task, in which a baby is raised by parents belonging to a 
different category.  In this study, the baby is presented with minimal features of what it would 
look like as an adult and though it is initially labeled for the child (e.g., cow), it is called a proper 
name in the actual task (e.g., Edith).   In the conflict trials, children were shown a picture of the 
immature animal (e.g., baby cow), the environment in which it was raised and the animals (e.g., 
adult pigs) who raised it.  Children were asked two questions: when the immature animal grew 
up would it have a physical feature from its own category or from the animals who raised it (e.g., 
for a baby cow raised by pigs: “When Edith got to be grown up, what did her tail look like, was 
it straight or curly?”) and would it have a behavior from its own category or from the animal who 
raised it (e.g., “When Edith got to be grown up, what sound did she make, did she say ‘moo’ or 
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did she say ‘oink’?”).  Older 4-year-olds used the immature animal’s category membership to 
determine its physical properties and its behavior when it was an adult.  The authors extended 
these findings to the domain of food (i.e., fruit) and plants (i.e., flower seeds).  Results such as 
these have been replicated numerous times with a variety of different stimuli and children from a 
variety of cultures (for example, Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin & Coley, 2002; Diesundruck, 
2001). 
Additionally, natural kinds are constrained by the very nature of their internal structure 
from becoming anything else.  Keil (1992) examined whether children understood that an 
animal’s insides was what defined an animal.  Keil (1992) tested this by presenting participants 
with the insides (e.g., blood, bone, organs) of one animal, but the outsides (e.g., color, fur) of 
another animal.  An example used in this study was a picture of an animal that had the insides of 
a raccoon, but a strip of fur was shaved down the middle of its back, painted white and a stink 
sac attached to its tail.  When asked whether the animal was a raccoon or a skunk, Keil (1992) 
found that most of the 5-year-olds and half of the 7-year-olds had problems recognizing the 
animal as a raccoon, suggesting that essentialist reasoning is still developing in the early school 
years.   
Artifacts.  Artifacts, on the other hand, are not considered natural kinds.  Artifacts are 
human-made creations with flexible category membership (Bloom, 1996; German & Johnson, 
2002; Jaswal, 2006).  Artifacts are mostly categorized by function rather than by an underlying 
essence that links all members of the category to that particular category (German & Johnson, 
2002; Jaswal, 2006; Kemler Nelson, Holt, & Egan, 2004).  As Bloom (1996) succinctly 
addresses it, “We infer that the novel entity has been successfully created with the intention to be 
a member of artifact kind X – and thus is a member of artifact kind X – if its appearance and 
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potential use are best explained as resulting from the intention to create a member of artifact kind 
X” (p.12).  Artifacts are subjective and flexible with fuzzy category boundaries.  If two 
physically identical objects were created, one meant for a teapot and the other meant as a 
watering can, these would be categorized respectively by their function.  Thus, the criteria used 
to categorize artifacts are its function or the creator’s intended use.  Yet there are some 
essentialist aspects to this domain, such as discovering that young children categorize novel 
artifacts not based on perceptual similarity, but based on function similarity with function being 
a nonobvious, internal property (Diesendruck & Peretz, 2013; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Jaswal, 
2006; Kemler Nelson, Russell, Duke and Jones 2000a).                           
This privileged status of human intention on artifacts has been the subject of extensive 
research (Bloom, 1996; German & Johnson, 2002; Gopnik & Sobel, 2000; Hammer & 
Diesendruck, 2005; Jaswal, 2004, 2006; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blair, 2000b).  
Children are cognizant of the fact that objects have purpose and use this knowledge to categorize 
them (Gelman & Bloom, 2000).  Gelman and Bloom (2000) presented children with an array of 
items that were either created purposefully or accidentally; for example, a knife was purposefully 
blown from glass or it was dropped and broke into a shape of a knife.  Children labeled the 
intentionally made object a knife, but the accidentally made object by its substance, a piece of 
glass.   
Children also use the creator’s intention to categorize an artifact by using its label over its 
appearance (Jaswal, 2006; Jaswal & Markman, 2007).  Jaswal (2006) presented artifacts that 
were similar in appearance to one artifact, but labeled it as something different.  For example, a 
‘key-spoon’ that was a hybrid of both a key and a spoon: an artifact that looked similar to a key 
but was slightly rounded to model the function of the spoon.  Researchers demonstrated the 
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function of a prototypical key and spoon and then presented the hybrid with the label it least 
appeared like, e.g., key-spoon was labeled as spoon, and as something the researcher either 
found or had made.  Participants were asked to model how the hybrid should be used.  Both age 
groups used it based on the label given and not its appearance when the artifact was intentionally 
made, though they did not do this when the artifact had been found.  Therefore even in the 
artifact domain, preschoolers use the intended function as opposed to its appearance to determine 
category membership.  Furthermore, when 3- and 4-year-olds, and to a lesser extent 2-year-olds, 
are presented with novel artifacts, they are more likely to ask about the novel artifact’s function 
than they are to ask about its name (e.g., category membership; Kemler Nelson et al., 2004).  
 Kemler Nelson et al. (2000a) devised an elegant study to determine if 4-year-olds 
categorized artifacts by appearance or by function.  In this study, a novel target toy was first 
introduced to participants with a novel name (e.g., a gidget).  Following a short period of play 
time with the target toy, participants were shown 4 test toys.  The test toys were either: similar in 
both appearance and function; similar in appearance but not in function; dissimilar in appearance 
but similar in function; and dissimilar in both appearance and function to the target toy.  A set of 
two test toys was presented to the participants without being labeled and he/she was asked to 
hand a puppet the ‘gidget’, the label of the target toy.  Since multiple instances of the same test 
toys were presented across trials, participants were initially told that they would see the same 
toys more than once but that would be okay.  Four-year-olds more often selected the test toy 
similar in function to the target toy than those similar in appearance, thereby providing strong 
evidence that children categorize artifacts based on function rather than perceptual similarity to 
non-category members.   
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In sum, natural kinds are objective, real categories.  Changing the appearance or the 
properties associated with natural kinds cannot change category membership; therefore 
categorization is based on the entity kind or its category membership.  Artifacts are human-made, 
subjective and flexible and are categorized based on its function rather than appearance.  The 
studies proposed here will be the first to apply the methods of the naïve theory/essentialist 
perspective to the domain of information.  The second experiment will be the first study, to my 
knowledge, to determine if information is categorized by its category membership or by its 
function (whether it is shared or not).  Recall, the function of the information is analogous to the 
function of an artifact.  If children categorize information by its category membership regardless 
of whether it shared or not, then children are treating it similarly to natural kinds.  If children 
categorize information by whether it is shared or not, regardless of its category membership, then 
children are treating it similarly to artifacts.   
As described earlier in this section, the methods used to test children’s categorization of 
natural kinds are most often a conflict task pitting appearance against category membership (for 
example, Gelman & Markman, 1986).  The methods used to test children’s categorization of 
artifacts are most often a task pitting appearance against intended function (for example, Kemler 
Nelson et al., 2000a).  Since my second study will examine children’s categorization of 
information, I will use a conflict triad task pitting category membership against function.  This 
will be based upon the methods used in the Kemler Nelson et al. (2000a) and the Gelman and 
Markman (1986) studies.         
Current Research  
This dissertation will attempt to answer two questions:  1) Can preschool age children 
categorize information as privileged and conventional and 2) Do children categorize privileged 
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and conventional information by the type of information it is or by its function, e.g., whether a 
person decides to share it or not.   
To answer the first question, an examination of previous research revealed that by age 4 
children are differentiating between conventional and idiosyncratic types of information.  There 
is a gap, though, in both the information and categorization literatures on children’s distinction 
between conventional and privileged information types.  The available research on children’s 
identification of privileged and conventional information indicates that such a distinction does 
not begin to emerge until age 5 (Behrend & Girgis, under review), though 5-year-olds still do not 
perform as well as adults.  It may be that the methodologies used in these studies are too 
demanding for the general cognitive limitations of 4-year-olds.  Therefore in Study 1, I will use a 
simple sorting task to determine if children can recognize and categorize these information types.  
I will present colorful pictures that represent either conventional or privileged information and 
ask participants to sort them according to the depicted information type.  Based on the research 
cited earlier, I hypothesize that 4-year-olds will be able to accurately categorize conventional and 
privileged information.  I included 5-year-olds in my sample to examine any developmental 
trends in this ability.  Based on the previous research on children’s secret sharing and 
identification of secrets and non-secrets, I predict that participants in each older age group will 
more accurately categorize the depicted information than the younger group(s).  Lastly based on 
the natural pedagogy perspective, I hypothesize that 4-year-olds will be more accurate 
categorizing conventional information than privileged information.   
In addition to the main goal of determining when children categorize information, I will 
also investigate if the following variables influence the ability to correctly categorize pictures of 
the different types of information:  theory of mind, number of siblings, being the oldest sibling, 
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number of hours spent in preschool, and number of hours of playtime outside of preschool and 
sibling playtime.  With the exception of the theory of mind tasks, parents of participants will 
provide the responses to the questions about these variables.    
The second goal of my dissertation is to examine if children categorize information based 
on its category membership (the kind of information it is) or by its function (how a person uses 
it, specifically by whether the person decides to share it or not).  For example, a secret is 
privileged information.  Does the category membership of a secret change from privileged to 
conventional information if a person decides to share the secret with the general public?  If 
children believe it does, then the human intention for its use is the criterion used to categorize 
information, which is similar to how artifacts are categorized.  If children believe it does not, 
then the category membership of the information is the criterion used to categorize information, 
which is similar to how natural kinds are categorized.  In this second study, I present two target 
pictures: one each of privileged and conventional information, and identify the information type 
and whether it is shared or not.  A test picture will then be presented and participants are asked 
which of the target pictures is most similar to the test picture.  In the conflict trials, the test 
picture’s information type and function are mismatched, e.g., a secret is private information but 
is told to everyone.  In the consistent trials, the test picture’s information type and function 
match, e.g., a secret is private information and is not told to everyone.   
Past research (Diesendruck, 2001; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012; Gelman & Wellman, 1991) has found that essentialist 
reasoning emerges at age 4, but information is a unique domain in that it is invisible and abstract 
and has not been previously investigated.  It is important, though, to compare 4-year-olds’ 
categorization of information types to existing findings in the other domains (i.e., natural kinds 
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and artifacts).  For this second study, I will test 4-year-olds and compare their responses to 6-
year-olds and to adults.  I am testing 6-year-olds for comparison purposes since previous 
research has revealed it is not until closer to age 6 that children begin to differentially share and 
identify secrets from non-secrets.  Since this particular research question has not been asked 
before, adults will be tested to determine what criteria is used to categorize information.  
Responses from all three age groups should reveal any developmental change in the criteria used 
to categorize different types of information.   
If information is thought to be a natural kind, an objective, natural category, then I 
hypothesize that it will be categorized by its category membership.  If information is thought to 
be an artifact, a human social creation, then I hypothesize that it will be categorized by its 
function, i.e., how it is shared.  Based on the natural pedagogy perspective’s claim, that young 
children are predisposed to attend to conventional information and the different properties 
associated with the information types, I predict conventional information will be more often 
categorized by its membership than privileged information by participants in all three age 
groups.   
While compiling the specific instances of conventional and privileged information to use 
in these studies, special care was taken to ensure that the results would be specific to the 
information type and not confounded by valence or personal preference.  The list of conventional 
and privileged information is similar to the stimuli used in Behrend and Girgis (under review).  
All information is neutral in valence and comprises situations with which young children should 
be familiar.  Specifically, instances of rule violations were excluded, since these are negatively 
valenced and both children and adults believe they should be reported to the proper authority 
(Girgis & Behrend, 2012; Kim, Harris, & Warneken, 2014).  
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Study 1 
Methods  
 Participants.  There were a total of 70 participants: 23 four-year-olds (Mage = 4.4, 11 
females, age range = 3.8 to 4.9), 23 five-year-olds (Mage = 5.4, 9 females, age range = 5.00 to 
5.9) and 24 undergraduate students (Mage = 20.0, 16 females, age range = 18.4 to 25.1).  The 
undergraduate students were tested as a comparison group.  Sample sizes of between 20 to 24 
children per condition in categorization tasks are standard in the child development literature 
(see among others, Behrend & Girgis, under review; experiments in Gelman, 2003; experiments 
in Keil, 1992; Kemler Nelson et al., 2000a, 2000b).  Child participants were recruited from area 
preschools in a predominately middle class, European-American community located in the south 
central area of the United States.  The adults were undergraduate students in the same 
community who participated for course credit. 
 Materials.  A total of 12 pictures comprised the stimuli for Study 1.  These pictures were 
comprised of 10 test pictures and 2 category label pictures.  Pictures were colored clip art images 
taken from public domain online sources, such as Google Images, and were modified as needed 
in Microsoft Paint.  Five test pictures depicted conventional information: numbers, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6); alphabet (alphabet letters written individually on blocks); an animal (dog); a color (circle of 
the color green); and an object (cup).  Five test pictures depicted privileged information: a secret 
(a girl whispering in the ear of another girl); a wrapped present; children playing hide and seek; 
surprise party (balloons, streamers and confetti); and a password for a clubhouse (child climbing 
24 
 
into a tree house).  These laminated pictures were approximately 3 in. by 3 in. in size.  Two 
category label pictures represented the two information categories.  The category label picture 
depicting conventional information was a round yellow face with a hand cupping its open mouth 
indicating talking.  The category label picture depicting privileged information was a round 
yellow face with its finger to its lips indicating not talking.  Each category label picture was 
approximately 4.5 in. by 4.5 in. and laminated.  Each category label picture was taped to a 
wooden stick and affixed to the back of a shallow box.  See Appendix A for stimuli pictures.  For 
the two false belief tasks:  a laptop was used to administer the location change task and an empty 
box of M&M candy and crayons were used for the unexpected contents task.  Parents of child 
participants answered the following questions on the consent form: weekly number of preschool 
hours, number of siblings, whether he/she is the oldest sibling and weekly number of playtime 
hours excluding preschool and sibling playtime.       
 Procedure.  Child participants were tested in an empty classroom or a quiet area in their 
preschool.  Adults were tested in an empty classroom on the university campus.  All participants 
were tested individually.  The procedure took approximately 5 to 10 minutes to complete.       
 Familiarization Task.  A familiarization task was first administered to participants.  The 
purpose of this familiarization task was to define conventional and privileged information for 
participants.  To start, the term ‘public’ was substituted for conventional and ‘private’ was 
substituted for privileged as these terms are ones with which young children are more familiar.  
The researcher began by telling child participants they will learn two new words for the game.  
The researcher then defined public information and provided an example (e.g., “The first new 
word is public.  There are some things that you know and you can tell anyone you want to tell.  
These things are called public.  You can tell anyone about it.  For example if I learned that 1 + 1 
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is 2, I could tell anyone about it.”).  The researcher then defined private information and 
provided an example (e.g., “The second new word is private.  There are some things that you 
know that you cannot tell anyone.  These things are called private.  You cannot tell anyone about 
it.  For example, if I were playing a matching game, I could not tell the other person where the 
matching card was.”).  These definitions are similar to ones used in previous research for secrets 
and conventional information (see Anagnostaki, Wright, & Papathanasiou, 2013; Behrend & 
Girgis, under review; Watson & Valtin, 1997).  The researcher asked two follow up questions to 
ensure participant understanding (e.g., “So, if you knew some things you could tell anyone 
about, is that public or private?”).  If answered incorrectly, the researcher repeated the definition 
of both words and asked the questions again.  Participants who could not answer the questions 
properly the second time were excluded from the study.  As some of the younger participants 
were reticent to speak, acceptable answers included pointing to the appropriate category label 
picture to answer the follow up questions.     
 For adult participants, researchers explained that the study was being conducted by a 
cognitive development lab examining children’s knowledge of different types of information.  
Public and private information were defined using the same definitions and examples that were 
given to child participants.         
Test Trials.  Testing began immediately after the familiarization task.  The two category 
picture boxes were placed in front of the participant and the researcher sat next to the participant.  
The researcher instructed child participants on the procedure, e.g., “So, for this game I’m going 
to show you some pictures.  If you think the picture is private, something you could not tell 
anyone, then you would be put it in this box (researcher pointing to corresponding category 
picture box) and if you think the picture is public, something you could tell anyone, then you 
26 
 
would put it in this box (researcher pointing to corresponding category picture box).  Now, can 
you show me where you would put pictures that are private?  Can you show me where you 
would put pictures that are public?”.  Similar to the questions in the familiarization task, this 
procedure was used to ensure children knew the correct category label picture.  If participants 
answered incorrectly, then the researcher repeated the instructions and asked the follow up 
questions again.  Participants who could not answer the questions correctly the second time were 
excluded from the study.  The researcher then presented each picture to participants, described 
the content of the picture and asked if it belonged in the public or private box (e.g., “These are 
numbers to 6.  Should it go in the private, can’t tell, box or the public, can tell, box?  Put it in the 
box where you think it should go.”).  Answers were recorded by the experimenter.   
After the categorization task, two false belief tasks were administered.  On a laptop 
computer, the researcher presented a location change task to child participants.  There were five 
pictures depicting the Sally-Anne task and the researcher narrated each picture, e.g., “This is 
Sally.  This is Anne. Sally puts her ball in the basket.  Sally goes away.  Anne moves the ball to 
her box.  Where will Sally look for her ball?” (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  If participants 
answered “basket,” they passed the false belief task.  If participants answered “box”, they did not 
pass the false belief task.  The unexpected contents task was the second false belief task 
(Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986).  The researcher presented a box of M&M candy to the 
participant and asked what he/she thought was in the box.  All participants except for 2 answered 
candy or M&Ms.  The researcher then opened up the box to show the participant that there were 
crayons in it and asked, “So if your friend walked in here, what would they think is in the box?” 
If participants answered candy/M&Ms or what was originally thought to be in the candy box, 
27 
 
they passed the false belief task.  If the participant answered crayons, they did not pass the false 
belief task.   
Adult participants were tested similarly, though they were not asked the follow up 
questions for the category label pictures.  The researcher reiterated that the study was designed 
for preschoolers and we need to know in general if these types of information are ones you could 
tell anyone as opposed to ones you could not tell anyone.  Researchers also did not administer 
false belief tasks to adult participants nor did they ask the questions regarding number of siblings 
or hours of preschool and playtime.       
 To ensure there were no confounding variables that influenced participants’ responses, 
the following was done:  1) The category label boxes were randomly placed in front of the 
participants, so that some participants had the public category label box on the left while others 
had the private category label box on the left; 2) The order of the category labels in the test 
questions (public and private) was counterbalanced within and between participants; and 3) Two 
orders of the 10 items were created.  Half of the participants in each age group received each 
order.  In addition, a research assistant with minimal exposure to the hypotheses of the study 
tested a subset of the participants.   
Results  
 In the familiarization task, all child participants had to answer the follow up questions to 
the definitions of the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ in order to participate in the study.  Researchers 
repeated the definition and questions once for nine 4-year-olds and three 5-year-olds.  All 
participants correctly answered the questions the second time.   
 The number of times each participant responded correctly in categorizing the information 
the pictures depicted as public or private was summed and served as the dependent variable.  
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Two summary variables were created for information type: percent of correctly answered 
questions on the public information trials and percent of correctly answered questions on the 
private information trials.     
 In order to ensure there was no experimenter bias, an independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare total number of correct responses to both public and private information as 
a function of the researcher who tested the participants.  This analysis revealed no significant 
differences between responses when tested by the author of this dissertation (M = 74%) and an 
undergraduate research assistant (M = 66%), t(44) = 1.36, p = .18.   Thus, this variable was 
dropped from further analyses. 
In order to compare participants’ performance to chance a series of one sample t-tests 
was conducted for each age group, which revealed 4-year-olds were at above chance levels for 
correctly categorizing both public (M = 65%), t(22) = 3.46, p = .002, and private information (M 
= 67%), t(22) = 4.35, p < .001, 5-year-olds were at above chance levels for correctly categorizing 
both public (M = 80%), t(22) = 5.78, p < .001, and private information (M = 75%), t(22) = 6.46, 
p < .001 and adults correctly categorized the items at above chance levels for both public (M = 
100%) and private information (M = 99%), t(23) = 59, p < .00.  
In order to determine if there were differences in correct responses to the categorization 
task between the adults and child participants, a one way ANOVA with Age (4- and 5-year-olds 
and adults) as a between subjects factor revealed that adults were significantly better at correctly 
categorizing public and private information than 4- and 5-year-olds, F(2,69) = 20.56, p < .001, 
F(2, 69) = 27.39, p < .001, respectively.  Since the adults correctly categorized both information 
types at ceiling levels, I excluded them from the following analysis.  A 2 x 2 (Information Type 
[public, private] x Age (4-year-olds, 5-year-olds]) mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of age, 
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such that 5-year-olds had more correct responses across both information types (M = 77%) than 
4-year-olds (M = 66%), F(1,44) = 5.15, p = .02.  No other significant results were revealed.  See 
Table 1 for percent of correct responses to the categorization task by age group.   
Parents were asked a number of questions to determine if there was a correlation between 
the following variables and the ability to categorize the depicted information: number of weekly 
hours spent in preschool, number of siblings and being the oldest sibling, and number of 
playtime hours excluding preschool and sibling play time.  The average number of hours 
participants spent in preschool was 26.8, ranging from 6 to 45 hours.  For both 4- and 5-year-
olds, 12% had no siblings.  The number of siblings ranged from 1 to 4 with 22% of participants 
reporting they had one sibling and 16% of participants were the oldest sibling.  The mean 
number of hours participants spent playing with friends excluding preschool and sibling play 
time was 4.3, ranging from 0 to 10.  Fifty-six percent of 4-year-olds correctly answered at least 
one of the false belief tasks, while 78% of 5-year-olds correctly answered at least one of the false 
belief tasks.  Few of the child participants answered both false belief tasks correctly; therefore a 
0 was assigned to participants who did not answer correctly either of the false belief tasks and a 1 
if participants answered at least one correctly.   
A series of chi square tests and Pearson correlations were calculated to examine the 
relationship between responses on the categorization task and the responses on the false belief 
task, r = -.05, number of siblings, r = -.05, weekly hours in preschool, r = .18, and playtime 
(excluding preschool and sibling playtime), r = .02, and being the oldest sibling, r = -.05.  There 
was no systematic relation between any of those variables and the dependent variable, p’s > .23. 
Discussion  
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 Participants in each age group correctly categorized the information the pictures depicted 
as public and private at above chance levels.  Five-year-olds had significantly more correct 
responses than 4-year-olds, while adults had significantly more correct responses than both 4- 
and 5-year-olds.  Participants in each age group categorized public and private information 
equally well.  A number of variables were measured to determine if these were correlated with 
correctly categorizing the depicted public and private information.  The number of hours spent in 
preschool or playtime, number of siblings, being the oldest sibling and passing false belief tasks 
were not significantly correlated with the dependent variable:   
Study 2 
The results from Study 1 demonstrated that children as young as 4 are able to identify and 
distinguish between conventional and privileged information.  The goal of Study 2 was to 
determine how young children and adults categorize types of information.  For experimental 
trials, two target pictures were presented and labeled by their type of information and function.  
For example, participants are shown a picture of privileged information and told it is private and 
cannot be told to anyone and a picture of public information and told it is public and can be told 
to anyone.  Participants are then shown a test picture, labeled with its information type but its 
contrasting function (e.g., this is private but it has been told to everyone).  Participants are then 
asked which of the target pictures is most like the test picture.  If participants answered by 
matching the test picture with the target picture’s category membership, then they are using the 
same criteria used to categorize information as natural kinds.   If the participants answered by 
matching the test picture with the target’s picture function (whether it is shared or not), then they 
are using the same criteria used to categorize information as artifacts.    
Methods 
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 Participants.  There were a total of 68 participants: 22 four-year-olds (Mage = 4.66, 12 
females, age range = 3.99 to 5.2), 24 six-year-olds (Mage = 6.41, 13 females, age range = 6.06 to 
7.05) and 22 undergraduate students (Mage = 19.3, 14 females, age range = 18.3 to 20.17).  The 
undergraduate students were tested as a comparison group.  Most child participants were 
recruited from area preschools who were tested at their school, though seven 4-year-olds were 
recruited from the lab’s database of prior research participants and were tested in an on-campus 
laboratory.  All were from a predominately middle class, European-American community 
located in the south central area of the United States.  The adults were undergraduate students in 
the same community who participated for course credit. 
 Materials.  A total of 30 pictures comprised the stimuli for Study 2.  Pictures were 
colored clip art images taken from public domain online sources such as Google Images and 
were modified as needed in Microsoft Paint.  The same types of information used in Study 1 
were used in Study 2.  For conventional information, 3 pictures each depicted the following:  
numbers (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6); alphabet (alphabet letters); an animal (dog); a color (color green); and 
an object (cup).  For privileged information, 3 pictures each depicted the following:  a secret 
(someone whispering in the ear of another person); a wrapped present; children playing hide and 
seek; a surprise party; and a password for a clubhouse (a child climbing into a tree house).  These 
laminated pictures were approximately 3 in. by 3 in. in size.  See Appendix B for stimuli 
pictures.  Similar to Kemler Nelson et al.’s (2000a) use of the same toys over multiple trials, the 
same specific types of information (e.g., secret, name of animal) were used multiple times across 
trials for Study 2.  Though the specific information types will be the same, the pictures 
themselves are different and were not similar in detail to other pictures of the same specific type.  
Each picture, however, was easily identified as the type of information it was intended to depict.   
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Procedure.  Child participants were tested in an empty classroom or a quiet area in their 
preschool or in a campus laboratory.  Adults were tested in an empty classroom on the university 
campus.  The procedure took approximately 15 minutes to complete.   
 Familiarization Task.  Similar to Study 1, a familiarization task was first administered to 
participants.  The purpose of this familiarization task was to allow the researcher to define public 
and private information for the participant.  To start, the researcher defined public and private 
information using the same definitions and examples used in Study 1.  The same follow up 
questions were asked of the definitions that were used in Study 1.  If the participant answered 
incorrectly, the researcher repeated the definition of both words and asked the questions again.  
Participants who could not answer the questions properly the second time were excluded from 
the study.    
 For adult participants, researchers explained that the study was being conducted by a 
cognitive development lab examining children’s knowledge of different types of information.  
Public and private information were defined using the same definitions and examples that were 
given to the child participants.         
 Test Trials.  Immediately after the familiarization task, testing began.  The researcher 
first instructed the participant on the how the game would be played and that the participant 
would see the specific information types multiple times during the game, e.g., “Okay, I’m going 
to show you some different pictures of public and private things and I’m going to ask you which 
ones are more alike.  You will hear about the same kinds of things more than once during the 
game but that will be okay.  You just need to listen very carefully about what I have to say about 
each of them.  Okay?  I’m going to tell you some stories about my friend named Jane.”.  Jane 
was introduced to the participant in order for there to be a reason that the information in the test 
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picture was shared or not shared appropriately.  The instructions about seeing the pictures 
depicting the same types of information more than once are similar to Kemler Nelson’s (2000a) 
study regarding seeing the same toys across multiple trials.   
Consistent trials.  In these trials the test pictures’ category membership and function are 
consistent (e.g., private information that is not shared and public information that is shared).  
After presenting the two target pictures, the test picture (e.g., alphabet letters) is identified by its 
information type (e.g., public) and its correct function (e.g., telling everyone).  The trials served 
as control trials as well as to assess if children understood the procedure of the task.     
Conflict public trials.  In these trials the test picture is public and participants are told the 
correct category membership but the incorrect function (e.g., public information that is not 
shared).  After presenting the two target pictures, the test picture (e.g., alphabet letters) is 
identified by its information type (e.g., public) and the incorrect function (e.g., did not tell 
everyone).  These trials serve as experimental trials.      
Conflict private trials.  In these trials the test picture is private and participants are told 
the correct category membership but the incorrect function (e.g., private information that is 
shared).  After presenting the two target pictures, the test picture (e.g., birthday present) is 
identified by its information type (e.g., private) and the incorrect function (e.g., did tell 
everyone).  These trials also serve as experimental trials.  See Table 2 for list of stimuli by trial 
type.     
For both consistent and conflict trials, the researcher placed two target pictures, one at a 
time, in front of the participant.  One target picture depicted public information and one depicted 
private information.  The researcher identified the information type of each target picture and its 
function, (e.g., “See this, this is a birthday present which is private and cannot be told to anyone.  
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See this, these are numbers up to 6 which is public and can be told to anyone.”).  The researcher 
then presented the test picture, placing it underneath and in between the two target pictures.  For 
the consistent trials, the researcher identified the information in the picture and its correct 
function (e.g., “See this, this is a secret which is private and Jane does not tell this to everyone.”).  
For conflict public and private trials, the researcher identified the information in the picture and 
its incorrect function (e.g., “See this, this is the color green which is public but Jane does not tell 
this to everyone.” Or, “See this, this is a secret which is private but Jane tells this to everyone.”).  
In the consistent trials and both types of conflict trials, the conjunction (either ‘and’ or ‘but’) 
joining the information type and its function was emphasized by the researcher.  There were 4 
conflict public and 4 conflict private trials for a total of 8 experimental trials and 2 consistent or 
control trials for a total of 10 trials.  For the test question the participant was asked if the test 
picture was similar to either of the target pictures (e.g., “So, is it like this which is public and told 
or like this which is private and not told.”).  Children’s responses were coded as either matching 
or not matching the category membership of the target picture.   
The control trials were presented to ensure participants understood the procedure and 
were attending to the information given in each trial.  Memory check questions were included for 
the test pictures’ category membership and function after 4 of the 8 conflict trials to further 
ensure that participants accurately recalled the presented information, e.g., “So, did I say this was 
public or private?  Did Jane tell this to everyone or not tell everyone?” 
The procedure was exactly the same for the adults.  For instructions, though, the 
researcher reiterated the study was designed for preschoolers and we need to know in general 
which types of information are similar to each other. 
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  To ensure there were no confounding variables that influenced participants’ responses 
the following was done:  1) The presentation of the target pictures were counterbalanced across 
participants, such that some participants were presented with the public information picture first 
and others were presented with the private information first; 2) The wording of the category 
membership and function of the test picture was counterbalanced (e.g., private but Jane told 
everyone/Jane told everyone but it is private); 3) The order of the function and category 
membership terms in the test question was counterbalanced (e.g., is it like this which is public 
and told/is it like this which is told and public); and 4) Two orders of the 10 items were created.  
Half of the participants in each age group received each order.  In addition, a research assistant 
with minimal exposure to the hypotheses of the study tested a subset of the participants.   
Results  
 In the familiarization task, all child participants had to answer the follow up questions to 
the definitions of the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ in order to participate in the study.  Researchers 
had to repeat the definition and questions for ten 4-year-olds, but not for any of the 6-year-olds.  
All participants correctly answered the questions the second time.   
 In order to ensure there was no experimenter bias, an independent samples t-test was 
conducted to compare the category membership responses in the conflict trials.  This analysis 
revealed no significant differences between responses when tested by the author of this 
dissertation (M = 42%) and an undergraduate research assistant (M = 39%), t(22) = .20, p = .83.  
Thus, this variable was dropped from further analyses. 
Two memory check questions were asked after 4 of the 8 experimental trials.  The 
questions asked for the test picture was what type of information it was and if it were told or not 
told to everyone.  The proportion of the participants who responded correctly to the 8 memory 
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check questions served as the dependent variable.  A one-sample t-test, using a test value of .5, 
compared the proportion of correct responses from participants in each age group to chance.  
This analysis revealed that 4-year-olds answered the memory check questions correctly at above 
chance levels, (M = 67%), t(21) = 3.13, p = .005, as did 6-year-olds (M = 78%), t(23) = 6.39, p < 
.001 and adults (M = 94%) t(21) = 20.45, p < .001.  A one-way ANOVA revealed there was a 
significant difference in the accuracy of participant responses to the memory check questions 
between the age groups, F(2,60) = 8.69, p < .001.  Tukey’s HSD follow up analysis revealed that 
adults were more accurate than both 4- and 6-year-olds (p’s < .03), but there were no differences 
between the accuracy of 4- and 6-year-old responses (p = .16).  This provides evidence that 
participants were attending to the labeling of both the information type and how the information 
was shared in regards to the test picture; also the answers to the test question were not due to the 
misinformation about the test picture.   
Answers to the test question revealed whether participants categorized information by its 
category membership or by its function.  The number of times each participant selected the target 
picture’s category membership to categorize the information depicted in the test pictures was 
summed, converted to percentages and served as the dependent variable.  A 3 x 3 (Age [4-, 6-
year-olds, adults] x Trial Type [consistent, conflict public, conflict private]) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for trial type, F(2, 130) = 26.93, p < .001.  Follow up analyses were 
conducted for the main effect of Trial Type with a series of paired samples t-tests which revealed 
that participants, as a whole, categorized the depicted information significantly more often by its 
category membership in the consistent trials (M = 86%) than in the conflict public trials (M = 
55%) t(65) = 5.2, p < .001, and the conflict private trials (M = 50%), t(65) = 6.19, p < .001.  
There were no differences between the conflict public and conflict private trials.  In addition, an 
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Age x Trial Type interaction was found, F(4, 130) = 7.13, p < .001.  Follow up analyses were 
conducted for the Age x Trial Type interaction.  A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted 
for each trial type.  For the conflict public trials, participant category membership responses 
differed among age groups, F(2,65), = 4.53, p = .01.  Tukey’s HSD follow up analysis revealed 
that 4-year-olds (M = 67%) and adults (M = 63%) were more likely to categorize public 
information by its category membership than 6-year-olds (M = 36%), p = .02, p = .04, 
respectively, while 4-year-olds and adults did not differ from each other, p = .95.  For the 
conflict private trials, category membership responses did not differ among adults (M = 44%), 6-
year-olds (M = 46%) and 4- (M = 60%), F(2,65) = 1.23, p = .29.  Lastly, for the consistent trials, 
category membership responses did differ among the age groups, F(2,65) = 16.64, p < .001.  
Tukey HSD follow up analysis revealed that adults (M = 100%) and 6-year-olds (M = 93%) 
produced more category membership responses than 4-year-olds (M = 65%), p’s < .001.  See 
Table 3 for the percent of category membership responses as a function of age and trial type.   
In order to determine if participants were categorizing the conventional information more 
often by its category membership than the privileged information, paired samples t-tests were 
conducted comparing participants’ category membership responses of conflict public trials to 
conflict private trials.  Four-year-olds’ category membership responses to conflict public (M = 
67%) and private trials (M = 60%) did not differ, t(21) = .54 p = .59 and neither did 6-year-olds’ 
category membership responses between the conflict public (M = 36%) and conflict private trials 
(M = 46%), t(23) = 1.68, p = .10.  For adults, the percentage of category membership responses 
in the conflict public trials (M = 63%) was significantly greater than the percentage of such 
responses on conflict private trials (M = 44%), t(21) = 2.01, p = .05.   
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I also compared the proportion of category membership responses for each trial type by 
age group to chance using one sample t-tests.  These analyses revealed that 4-year-olds 
responded with category membership responses on consistent trials (M = 65%), t(21) = 2.30, p = 
.03, and conflict public trials at above chance levels (M = 67%), t(21) = 2.41, p = .02, but not on 
conflict private trials, p = .20, 6-year-olds responded with category membership responses to 
consistent trials at above chance levels (M = 93%), t(23) = 12.68, p < .001, but not on conflict 
public, p = .10, or private trials, p = .68, and adults responded with category membership 
responses on consistent trials at above chance levels (M = 100%), but not on conflict public, p = 
.13, or private trials, p = .44.   
The last analysis included an examination of the distribution of category membership 
responses for the conflict public and private trials.  With the exception of the 4-year-olds’ 
category membership responses to the conflict public trials, all other responses to the conflict 
public and private trials were at chance.  I wanted to determine if this pattern of responses within 
each age group represented participants who were individually consistent, but in different ways, 
when categorizing the information or if most participants were truly responding randomly.  If 
participants responded randomly then their pattern of responses should not differ from the 
expected binomial distribution.  The patterns of responses were examined separately for conflict 
public and conflict private trials, each of which had 4 trials.  These data are shown in Table 4.  
Four-year-olds’ patterns of responses were not significantly different from the binomial 
distribution on conflict public trials, χ2 (4) = 7.24, p > .1 nor the conflict private trials, χ2 (4) = 
8.39, p > .05.  Six-year-olds’ pattern of responses did not differ from the binomial distribution on 
the conflict private trials, χ2 (4) = 6.58, p > .1, but did differ from the binomial distribution on the 
conflict public trials, χ2 (4) = 14.04, p < .01.  Adults’ pattern of responses did not differ from the 
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binomial distribution on the conflict private trials, χ2 (4) = 4.56, p > .1, but did differ from the 
binomial distribution on the conflict public trials, χ2 (4) = 13.36, p < .01.   
Discussion   
 As expected, participants across the age groups categorized the information types by its 
category membership more often for consistent trials than for the either of the conflict trials.  
Four-year-olds and adults both categorized the conventional information more often by its 
category membership than 6-year-olds.  There were no differences in how participants 
categorized privileged information.     
When comparing category membership responses between conflict public and conflict 
private trials, only adults categorized conventional information more often by its category 
membership than privileged information.  Four- and 6-year-old category membership responses 
did not differ between public and private information.  Four-year-olds did categorize public 
information by its category membership at above chance levels, but did not do so for private 
information.  Both 6-year-olds and adults did not categorize public or private information by its 
category membership at above chance levels.         
For private information, participant responses did not differ from the binomial 
distribution, therefore there was no pattern of responses across the conflict private trials.  
However, there was a pattern of participant responses for the 6-year-olds and adults when they 
categorized public information.  Adults were more likely to categorize the depicted public 
information by its category membership across all trials, while 6-year-olds were more likely to 
categorize the depicted public information by its function across all trials.  While the distribution 
of responses of the 4-year-olds when categorizing public information did not differ from chance, 
recall they did categorize public information by its category membership at above chance levels.      
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General Discussion 
With the decades of research on what, when and how children categorize, one domain 
that has not been investigated is when and how children categorize information types, 
specifically conventional and privileged information.  Imagine what it would be like to not be 
able to distinguish between these different types of information.  What would happen if a person 
treated all information similarly, for example as if it were all conventional?  One possibility 
would be this person would believe that all brown dogs are named Bob because their brown pet 
dog is named Bob.  While this example is not particularly consequential, there are severe 
consequences for not appropriately identifying or disseminating information.  What if a person 
treated all information as if it were privileged?  It would be nearly impossible to both 
communicate and learn.  Therefore, it is important to both understand how and when this ability 
develops and how it fits into the larger theoretical framework of how children in general learn 
about their world.    
The specific goals of this research was to investigate, in two studies, the answers to the 
following questions:  1) can preschool children categorize information as privileged and 
conventional and 2) do children categorize privileged and conventional information by the type 
of information it is or by its function, specifically whether a person decides to share it or not.   
In Study 1, 4- and 5-year-olds and adults sorted pictures of conventional and privileged 
information into boxes labeled pictorially as either conventional or privileged.  The results 
supported two of the three hypotheses for this study.  I hypothesized that by using pictures to 
depict the different types of information and a simple sorting task, 4-year-olds should be able to 
categorize and distinguish between conventional and privileged information and they did.  
Participants in all three age groups correctly categorized conventional and privileged 
41 
 
information.  The second hypothesis, that participants in each older age group would more 
accurately categorize information than the younger group(s) was also supported.  Adults were 
significantly more likely to correctly categorize both conventional and privileged information 
more often than 4- and 5-year-olds, while 5-year-olds were significantly more likely to correctly 
categorize both information types information than 4-year-olds.  The results did not support the 
third hypothesis that 4-year-olds would be more accurate categorizing conventional information 
than privileged information.       
I expected that 4-year-olds had the ability to identify and distinguish between 
conventional and privileged information, but the methods used previously were not sensitive 
enough to elicit their true abilities in this domain.  Using a simple sorting task and pictures 
depicting types of conventional and privileged information which were familiar to preschool 
children, over two-thirds of the 4-year-olds correctly categorized the conventional and privileged 
information.  Although this is the first study to find that children as young as 4 have the ability to 
categorize conventional and privileged information, it does fit with previous research on 
children’s ability to distinguish between conventional and idiosyncratic information. Children as 
young as two years of age are able to differentiate between the properties of idiosyncratic 
information (e.g., personal preference) and conventional information (e.g., names of objects) 
when interacting with another person (Diesendruck, 2005; Diesendruck & Markman, 2003; 
Graham et al., 2006; Henderson & Woodard, 2012; Novack et al., 2014).   In addition, 4-year-
olds’ can correctly categorize natural kinds, artifacts and human kinds (e.g., gender) and are able 
to categorize novel items in these domains using nonobvious properties (Diesendruck, 2001; 
Gelman & Kremer, 1991; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Heyman & Giles, 2006; Jaswal, 2004; 
Keleman et al., 2000a).    
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Thus, it appears that children can identify privileged information before they are able to 
properly use this type of information, e.g., not share it freely with others.  A preponderance of 
the literature on children’s sharing secrets has found that preschool children will share secrets 
and privileged information more indiscriminately compared to older children (Behrend & Girgis, 
under review; Bottoms et al., 2002; Peskin & Ardino, 2003; Pipe & Wilson, 1994; Watson & 
Valtin, 1997).  In many cases, it is not until age 6 when children begin to withhold sharing 
secrets or privileged information from others.  Young children’s ability to identify a particular 
concept before being able to appropriately use it is not an uncommon phenomenon in 
development.  Peskin & Ardino (2003) found that 3-year-olds could correctly explain the rules of 
hide and seek to a third party, but could not correctly play the game by those same rules.  In 
addition, research on selective trust has found that 3-year-olds are able to identify accurate 
informants versus inaccurate informants even though they do not use this knowledge to 
selectively choose who they would like to learn from in subsequent interactions with the same 
informants (Koenig & Harris, 2005).  It appears the same development trend holds true for how 
children learn about the differences between conventional and privileged information, as 4-year-
olds are able to both identify and distinguish between conventional and privileged information 
but still share secrets in experiments in a first person format (Bottoms et al., 2002) and endorse 
characters’ sharing secret or privileged information in experiments in a third person format 
(Behrend & Girgis, under review; Watson & Valtin, 1997).  Where children as young as 2 are 
able to modify their social interactions based on the differential presentation of conventional and 
idiosyncratic information, it appears that experience plays a greater role in being able to 
appropriately use privileged information.  These findings seem to fit into the naïve theory 
perspective of children’s learning, which claims children are creating naïve theories of the world 
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around them in domains such as biology and physics and, in this case, information (Diesendruck, 
2003; Murphy, 2002; Wellman et al., 1997).  Children continue to modify their naïve theories as 
they continue to learn and interact with others.   
The most important type of information for young children and one that most of their 
social interactions revolve is conventional information (Csibra & Gergeley, 2009; Diesendruck, 
2012; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Tomasello, 2008).  The natural pedagogy perspective 
underscores the importance of young children being able to both recognize and to utilize the 
properties associated with conventional information with empirical evidence to support this 
perspective (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  Because of young children’s predisposition to learning 
conventional information and their limited cognitive resources, understanding the function of 
privileged information may not as important or as central to their daily lives as being able to 
differentiate between the information types.   
The results did not show, however, that 4-year-olds were better at categorizing 
conventional information than privileged information as was hypothesized.  According to the 
natural pedagogy perspective, our communication system is designed for young children to be 
both sensitive and attentive to ostensive cues that indicate to children that the information about 
to be imparted is conventional in nature (Csibra & Gergely, 2009).  The amount of information 
children learn about natural kinds, artifacts, human kinds, and cultural and social norms at such a 
young age reflects the fact that a majority of the information transmitted to them is conventional; 
therefore, most of their experience is with conventional information (Cisbra & Gergely, 2009; 
Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Tomasello, 2008).  It seemed likely because of this exposure to 
conventional information that young children would be more accurate at categorizing 
conventional information than privileged information.  This was not the case for 4-year-olds, 
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since they were able to categorize both types of information equally well.  It could be that 
because of their adeptness at identifying conventional information, 4-year-olds identified 
information that was not conventional with the only other choice available; i.e., privileged 
information.  While this possibility should be examined, it does not seem likely since the 
procedure did not differ for each of the information types, e.g., providing ostensive cues for 
conventional information but not for privileged information.  Children received the same cues 
and questions for the conventional information items as for the privileged information items and 
were able to distinguish between them.  Future research should further examine this issue by 
asking children to categorize information using properties other than being shareable, such as its 
generalizability or whether it is known by other people.  A crucial next step will be to examine 
how children categorize novel items within each information type.  This will provide evidence 
that children are not simply aping what has been told to them (e.g., ‘don’t tell mom what I got for 
her birthday’), but are recognizing the properties associated with these types of information.   
In an attempt to examine why there may be individual differences in categorizing the 
different types of information, a variety of variables were measured that intuitively seemed 
related to the development of correctly categorizing of conventional and privileged information.  
These were the number of siblings, being the oldest sibling and the weekly number of hours 
spent in preschool and playtime (excluding preschool and sibling playtime).  Two false belief 
tasks were also administered to child participants, as the knowledge that other people have 
different mental states from oneself should increase awareness of information that should not be 
shared with others.  Interestingly, none of these variables were correlated with rates of correct 
responses on the categorization task.  These null findings could be due to a small sample size and 
limited variability in child participant responses to both the categorization task and the measured 
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variables.  In addition, current perspectives on the development of theory of mind has argued that 
using false belief tasks as the sole measure of theory of mind development may miss earlier 
achievements in this domain that might be related to the abilities of interest in these studies 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004).              
The first study found that 4-year-olds are able to distinguish between conventional and 
privileged information.  The second study investigated what criteria children were using to 
differentiate between these information types.  Specifically, I wanted to determine if children 
categorize privileged and conventional information by its category membership or by its 
function, e.g., whether it is shared or not shared with other people.  To my knowledge, this is the 
first study to investigate such a research question.  While there are decades of research on how 
children categorize both known and novel category members in other domains, information 
categorization is unique because information is both abstract and invisible.  
    These results did not fully support a conclusion that information is treated similarly to 
either natural kinds or artifacts.  While only 4-year-olds categorized conventional information by 
its category membership, a pattern of categorizing conventional information among the age 
groups emerged.  The pattern of categorization of conventional information by its category 
membership is U-shaped, with 6-year-olds significantly less likely to categorize conventional 
information by its category membership than both 4-year-olds and adults.  While this pattern was 
not predicted, it is a pattern found in other areas of cognitive development.  The classic example 
is young children’s overregulization of grammatical rules to irregular words, e.g., ‘goed’ or 
‘falled’ (Marcus et al., 1992; Pinker, 1991).  Young children are able to appropriately apply 
grammar rules to irregular words only to regress and inappropriately apply these grammar rules 
before being able to again appropriately apply grammatical rules to irregular words.  One of the 
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explanations for this pattern is that there is a qualitative shift in children’s reasoning from one 
based on associations and memory to one based on rigid rules, which blocks previous experience 
in the domain, and then the end stage that is based on increased experience with the rules 
culminating in an appropriate understanding of both the application of and exceptions to them 
(Marcus et al. 1992).   
 It may be that this same process applies to how children learn to categorize conventional 
information.  It may be young children’s predisposition to learn conventional information makes 
them highly attuned to its properties, specifically that conventional information is generic, 
known to others and shareable to all others.  As children transition to kindergarten, types of 
information are being defined more often in terms of whether it is shared or not, rather than any 
of its other properties.  By the time they are 6 years old, children also have more experience with 
different types of information.  Their predisposition to treat novel information as conventional 
may have attenuated as they begin to experience the negative consequences of sharing privileged 
information.  Additionally, as children get older and are more often away from the direct 
supervision of parents (or other caregivers), there may be more instruction on what types of 
information should be shared or not shared.  Children in kindergarten are also now in a 
structured setting where explicit pedagogical teacher-student relationship is entrenched and 
students are expected to answer questions when asked, further reinforcing that conventional 
information should be shared with others.  It may be that all of these circumstances focus 6-year-
olds on identifying information as what can be shared or not shared rather than by its total set of 
properties.  Similar to other domains with U-shaped developmental curves, application of this 
rule then blocks previous knowledge of the entire set of properties of different types of 
information and children only apply the rule of whether information is shared or not to identify 
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the information.  As children get older and have learned the ‘sharing rule’ along with when 
exceptions can be made, they revert back to using category membership to identify conventional 
information.  While the supposition put forth here for why a U-shaped curve for the development 
of categorization needs to be empirically investigated, some support for it is derived from 
research which has found that it is not until age 6 when children begin to understand that 
privileged information should not be shared with others (Angostaki et al., 2010; Behrend & 
Girgis, under review).    
An alternate explanation to the U-shaped development curve of how conventional 
information is categorized is that 6-year-olds are employing multiple categorization strategies.  
According to the dynamic systems theory, development is constantly in motion and 
interconnected to all aspects of a child’s life: biological, cognitive and social (Thelen & Smith, 
2006).  All of the forces that influence children’s performance will sometimes appear as a pattern 
of responses, but it may only be for a fleeting time or may be indicative of multiple strategies 
rather than a single strategy.  The utilization of multiple strategies can manifest as an inability to 
perform certain tasks that children had previously been able to perform.  A classic example is 
children’s performance on mathematical problems where it appears that children have increased 
difficulty answering questions they were once able to easily answer (Siegler, 1987).  This 
explanation does not account for the pattern of responses across the age groups, though.  Results 
revealed that 6-year-olds’ and adults’ categorization of conventional information did not result 
from random responses across trials, which might have indicated multiple strategies being 
engaged to categorize conventional information, but from individuals categorizing consistently 
by category membership or by function.  In any case, future research must provide additional 
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empirical evidence in order to clarify the underlying mechanisms of developmental patterns of 
information categorization.      
 I hypothesized that participants would more often categorize conventional information 
by category membership than privileged information.  While adults use category membership to 
categorize conventional information more so than privileged information, there were no 
differences between how these information types were categorized for the younger age groups.  
If members of one’s culture knows the content of the information (e.g., the color green is green), 
then the decision to share or not share is not a central property in categorizing conventional 
information as conventional.  On the other hand, a central property of privileged information is 
that should not be shared with others.  Indeed this is how it is defined both in this dissertation 
and by previous research on secrets and privileged information (for examples see Anagnostaki et 
al. 2010, 2013; Behrend & Girgis, under review; Watson & Valtin, 1997; Vangelisti, 1994; 
Vangelisti & Caughlin, 1997).  Furthermore, it is not expected to be known by others and is not 
generic.  Therefore, sharing a specific piece of privileged information, e.g., sharing this 
particular secret, may change it from private to public.  These differences in properties that 
define the information types appear to be of importance in determining how it is categorized and 
does need to be more thoroughly examined in future studies.        
The lack of difference between how younger children categorize conventional and 
privileged information may be related to the finding that 4- and 6-year-olds and adults did not 
categorize privileged information solely by its category membership or function, but rather 
categorized privileged information using both of these dimensions.  There was no consistent 
pattern of responses when categorizing privileged information and no differences among the age 
groups.  It could be that participants were not reasoning about this type of information as part of 
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a larger domain (e.g., natural kinds/artifacts), but were categorizing it on a case-by-case basis.  
Yet Study 1 revealed that children as young as 4 are able to categorize privileged information, 
therefore it seems probable that there is some property of privileged information that identifies it 
as such rather than what appears to be a random utilization of either category membership or 
function when categorizing it.  These ambiguous results underscores that this study is the first 
attempt to understand how privileged information is categorized.  It seems that how we 
conceptualize privileged information lies at a point somewhere between natural kinds and 
artifacts.  Other methods from the categorization literature could be used to have a better 
understanding of how this information is categorized.  I will discuss this further in the limitations 
and the future research sections that follow.         
It appears from the results from the second study, these information types are 
conceptualized differently.  By categorizing conventional information by its category 
membership and not by its function, 4-year-olds treat conventional information as an objective 
category with inflexible boundaries.  This is an important finding as being able to categorize 
conventional information by its category membership increases the ease with which children can 
process and reason about it; for those in these age groups, conventional information is both stable 
and predictable (Diesendruck, 2003; Gelman, 2003).  The differences in how 6-year-olds 
categorize conventional information makes it apparent that conventional information may shift in 
how it is conceptualized depending upon age.  Whether information is shared or not seems to 
become the defining property for conventional information for 6-year-olds.  Therefore, even 
though conventional information is treated as a natural kind at times throughout development, it 
would not be considered a true natural kind since its conceptualization shifts across time 
(Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1992).   
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It appears from this initial study that different types of information are reasoned about 
differently and information as a whole is not treated exclusively as a natural kind or as an 
artifact.  Though it was important in this initial examination to treat information as either a 
natural kinds or artifact, it appears that this domain is more complex than this simple dichotomy.  
This pattern in which some types of information are more essentialized than others is similar to 
how human kinds are categorized than to either natural kinds or artifacts (Diesendruck, Goldfein, 
Rhodes, Gelman & Neumark, 2013; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009; Taylor, Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  Essentialist reasoning for all social categories does not 
develop simultaneously and is impacted by environmental and contextual factors.  The 
differences between children’s categorization of natural kinds and human kinds appear to be in 
the timing and origin of their essentialist beliefs (Haslam et al., 2000; Gelman, 2003; Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009; Taylor et al., 2009).  While naïve theories of natural kinds and artifacts revolve 
around a central theme, such as selecting category membership or human intention to categorize 
all members belonging to that domain, social categories are diverse and vary in to what degree 
they are essentialized vary by culture and even community (Halsam et al., 2000; Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  Many social categories have properties that are 
conventional, socially constructed, subjective and flexible (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Heywood 
& Giles, 2006).  Children essentialize natural kinds from infancy, providing significant evidence 
that there is a cognitive bias to conceptualize all natural kinds in this manner (Gelman, 2003).  
This bias to essentialize natural kinds from infancy has been found across many diverse cultures 
as well (Bailenson et al., 2002; Diesendruck, 2001).  In the case of social categories, children 
will essentialize some categories, such as gender, from a very young age, but not others such as 
race (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  The pattern of how different information types are categorized 
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may reveal a similar pattern to how we categorize human kinds, with some information types, 
such as conventional information, essentialized at an earlier age than other information types.    
 A common paradigm to test essentialism with social categories is with an adoption task.  
A typical example is an infant of one category (e.g., baby girl) is raised by members of another 
category (e.g., all males; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor, 1996).  Adoption tasks focused on 
gender have found that found young children believe gender is a highly essentialized category 
and the behavioral properties associated with gender cannot be changed by the environment (e.g., 
girl raised by all boys will want to sew when she grows up rather than build things or a girl 
raised only by her father will still play with dolls when she is older; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; 
Taylor, 1996).  Young children also gave essentialist explanations, such as using “brain, instinct 
or desires” to explain why girls have certain biological properties (e.g., girl blood) and why 
behavior is gender-stereotyped (e.g., girls play with a tea set versus a toy truck; Taylor & 
Gelman, 1993).   
Interestingly, gender, as a social category, often becomes more flexible and less 
essentialized with age, while other social categories often become more essentialized, such as 
race (Rhodes & Gelman; 2009).  At this point, environmental factors rather than category 
membership will more often influence how properties are assigned to different genders.  While 
research supports that young children use essentialist reasoning as a domain general mechanism 
for understanding their world, many researchers believe that learning occurs through domain-
specific mechanisms, e.g., learning language and grammar rules (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; 
Chomsky, 1980).  Depending upon the domain, experience and knowledge of one’s culture can 
shift our reasoning, which is apparent in how the reasoning about gender develops over time.  It 
is feasible that the differences found between how people categorize conventional and privileged 
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information is due to the inherent social nature of acquiring and disseminating information.  
From this first attempt to answer how and when we categorized information, it appears that 
conventional information is essentailzied at a young age but also shifts with age and exposure to 
environmental forces.  The specifics of how culture impacts our reasoning of information types 
is still to be determined, but it is a necessary next step in understanding how we think, reason and 
process information.   
Limitations   
 While Study 1 was a simple sorting task with pictures for the category labels to help 
identify conventional and privileged information, Study 2 was more complex.  Though a 
developmental pattern did emerge for how conventional information is categorized, there were 
no difference among the age groups for how privileged information was categorized.  
Additionally, participants selected either category membership or function to categorize 
privileged information.  Based on the apparent ease of which adults are able to identify 
privileged information from conventional information (Anagnostaki et al., 2010; Behrend & 
Girgis, under review) and the efficiency of human categorization and reasoning processes (for 
example, see Gioia & Poole, 1984), one would assume that adults categorize privileged by some 
defining set of properties, but this was not revealed by this study.  Children also did not use any 
defining set of properties to categorize privileged information.  Although pictures were used to 
represent the information types in Study 2, the stimulus pictures were defined verbally in terms 
of information type and function.  The wording may have hampered young children’s 
understanding of the task and have been too demanding on children’s working memory, though 
the correct responses on the consistent trials and memory check questions does not fully support 
this conclusion.   
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It may be that defining these types of information by only one property - whether it is 
shared or not - is not sufficient to elicit how children categorize privileged information.  The 
multiple properties that are key to how conventional information is defined may be needed to 
fully distinguish between conventional and privileged information.  For example, sharing a 
specific secret with everyone may indeed make that information ‘public’ as I defined it in the 
studies.  The seemingly random selection of criteria to categorize privileged information across 
trials may be due to only categorizing information by its sharing property.  While this is of 
interest, the role the property of sharing plays in how information is categorized, it does not 
reveal a complete picture of how information is categorized.     
Future Directions 
 Since these are the first studies to investigate when and how we categorize conventional 
and privileged information, there are many future directions for this research.  One of the first 
should examine exactly when children are able to categorize conventional and privileged 
information and when this ability matches that of adults.  The study should be extended to both 
younger and older children to understand the full developmental pattern of the categorization of 
prototypical conventional and privileged information.  Future research should also investigate the 
categorization of information types beyond prototypical conventional and privileged information.  
There are certain types of information that may not be easily identified as conventional, 
privileged or idiosyncratic; these should be examined in both sorting tasks and using other 
methods, such as a reaction time task.  To investigate whether children’s categorization of 
privileged information reflects understanding at a conceptual level or mere identification of 
normative behaviors (e.g., not telling a surprise), an inductive inference task extending 
54 
 
information properties to novel instances is needed (for example, see Ahn, Kim, Lassaline & 
Dennis, 2000 and Heyman & Gelman, 2000).     
Follow up studies examining how privileged information is categorized will be helpful to 
illuminate how we reason and identify these types of information.  One simple way to do this is 
to use an uninformed character (such as an alien from a faraway place) who, highlighting 
different properties of the information types, directly asks children which information types can 
be grouped together and which do not go together (for example, see Rhodea & Gelman, 2009).  
Similar to many of the natural and social kinds categorization tasks, the adoption task paradigms 
could further clarify how privileged information is categorized as well (for example, see Gelman 
& Wellman, 1991).  A type of information, e.g., public, which is surrounded only by a different 
type of information, e.g., private.  Children would then be asked to identify the type of 
information or the properties associated with it.  There are decades of research on how children 
categorize, and while information is a unique domain, it is important to modify the existing and 
valid methods to use in this domain.  Additionally, past research on conventional information has 
provided a complete set of properties for it (Csibra & Gergeley, 2009; Diesendruck, 2012; 
Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008; Tomasello, 2008), and the same has to be provided for privileged 
information.  There cannot be a full examination of how privileged information is conceptualized 
unless we understand what properties are central and peripheral to its definition.     
Lastly, future research should further examine why there are differences in both the 
ability to categorize different types of information and how these are categorized.  It seemed 
intuitive that theory of mind or social interactions either with siblings or at preschool would be 
correlated with ability to identify types of information, but this was not found in Study 1.  The 
stark differences in responses to the conflict public trials in Study 2, as well, warrants an in-depth 
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investigation of why individuals categorize by function versus category membership and how 
this may relate to wider domain general differences in cognitions.  While additional cognitive 
tests should be administered, asking children and adults why they answered as they did should be 
revealing as well.      
 
Conclusions 
Take a second moment to imagine what it would be like to not be able to differentiate 
among the different types of information.  It is almost incomprehensible and would certainly 
greatly reduce our ability to interact with both our environment and other people.  With the 
advent of technology and the easy access to both retrieve and disseminate information, 
understanding and recognizing different types of information becomes all the more important.  
These two studies have found that children as young as 4 are able to both identify and distinguish 
between conventional and privileged information and the criteria used to categorize these 
information types differ.  It appears that there may be a U-shaped curve in the conceptual 
development of our knowledge of conventional information, but this pattern is not found for 
privileged information.  These combined findings provide a valuable insight into children’s 
categorization of information types and begins to lay the foundation to understand children’s 
conceptual development in this domain.            
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Table 1 
 
Percent of correct responses to categorization task by information type 
 
 
                Conventional Information     Privileged Information  
 
                              M    SD                   M  SD 
 
   
 
4-year-olds           65             21        67  18    
 
 
6-year-olds          80   24        75  19   
 
 
Adults           100   0        99  4 
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Table 2  
 
List of stimuli by trial type for Study 2  
 
    Category Label    Shared or Not Shared 
 
 Consistent Trials  
Target 1   Birthday present   Not shared  
Target 2   Numbers to 6    Shared  
Test Picture    Secret     Not shared  
Target 1   Cup       Shared  
Target 2   Hide and Seek    Not shared  
Test Picture    Dog    Shared  
Conflict Public Trials  
Target 1   Alphabet Letters   Shared  
Target 2   Surprise Party    Not shared  
Test Picture    Color Green    Not shared  
Target 1   Numbers to 6     Shared  
Target 2   Birthday present   Not shared  
Test Picture    Dog      Not shared  
Target 1   Color green    Shared  
Target 2   Password    Not shared  
Test Picture    Cup    Not shared  
65 
 
Target 1   Dog       Shared  
Target 2   Surprise party    Not shared  
Test Picture    Alphabet Letters   Not shared  
Conflict Private Trials  
Target 1   Surprise party     Not shared  
Target 2   Alphabet Letters   Shared  
Test Picture    Birthday Present   Shared  
Target 1   Cup       Shared  
Target 2   Hide and Seek    Not shared  
Test Picture    Password     Shared  
Target 1   Secret       Not shared  
Target 2   Numbers to 6    Shared  
Test Picture    Numbers    Shared  
Target 1   Color green     Shared  
Target 2   Password     Not shared  
Test Picture    Secret    Shared  
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Table 3 
 
Percent of category membership responses by trial type  
 
 
              Consistent      Conflict Public   Conflict Private   
 
                         M        SD        M     SD                  M     SD               
 
 
4-year-olds            62         31       70        30       57      37  
 
6-year-olds            93 16       36      39       46      37         
 
Adults            100        0       63      40       44         34  
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Table 4  
 
Number of category membership responses per trial by age and trial type  
 
 
 
   Conflict Public     Conflict Private  
 
Trial No      0     1     2    3   4     0 1 2 3 4  
 
 
4-year-olds     2          2     5      5     8  4 2 3 7 6 
 
6-year-olds    10         4     4      1     5   6 4 6 3 5 
 
Adults      4      3      2      3    10  6 3 5 6 2 
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Appendix A  
 
Category label pictures  
  Public     Private 
                                                                                           
    
 
Public information  
1. Numbers  
 
 
 
2. Alphabets  
 
 
 
3. Dog  
 
 
 
 
4. Color 
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5. Cup 
 
 
 
Privileged information  
1. Secret  
 
 
 
2. Birthday present  
 
 
3. Hide and seek 
  
 
 
 
 
4. Surprise party  
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5. Password to clubhouse 
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Appendix B 
Public information  
1. Numbers  
 
 
 
2. Alphabets  
 
 
 
3. Dog  
 
 
 
 
4. Color 
 
 
 
 
5. Cup 
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Privileged information  
6. Secret  
 
 
 
 
7. Birthday present  
 
 
 
8. Hide and seek 
  
 
 
 
 
9. Surprise party  
 
 
 
 
10. Password to clubhouse 
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